How Saudi Arabia got caught in middle of nuclear tug-of-war between US and China

It was by far the most lavish ceremony for a foreign leader in years, featuring cannon salutes, a fighter jet escort and a parade of Saudi Royal Guard swordsmen.

As Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman led Xi Jinping through the white-gold halls of Al Yamamah Palace, he was even rewarded with a rare smile from the typically dour Chinese president.

That rich December 2022 reception, far warmer than the one laid on five months prior for President Joe Biden, quickly set tongues wagging in Washington about Beijing trying to usurp them as the Gulf state’s most powerful ally.

But the full extent of Chinese-American rivalry towards Saudi Arabia only became clear last week, as it emerged that Beijing has sought to undercut Mr Biden with a cheaper and more attractive offer to the Saudis on building a nuclear power programme.

The Chinese bid to build a nuclear plant inside the Kingdom is being carefully considered by Saudi officials, who have spent years lobbying the United States for nuclear aid with minimal progress.

For the time being, Saudi Arabia does not appear to harbour any ambitions towards acquiring nuclear weapons, though some states in the region, notably Israel, fear this could be on the horizon.

Crucially China’s offer contains none of the conditions being sought by the US, such as a ban on Saudi Arabia enriching its own uranium stocks or mining uranium deposits on Saudi soil – two processes necessary for producing nuclear weapons.

It also comes as Saudi Arabia mulls an offer to join the Russia-friendly trade group BRICS, which currently consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

Accepting either proposal will add more fuel to suspicions that Saudi Arabia could be drifting away from its traditional role as a staunchly pro-Western ally in the Middle East.

Those familiar with the Saudi strategy say it has become clear that the Crown Prince is eager to take advantage of being caught in a major diplomatic tug-of-war between the two superpowers.

Trying to ‘troll’ Mr Biden

Sir John Jenkins, a veteran UK diplomat and former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, said it was even possible that Saudi officials were trying to “troll” Mr Biden by disclosing details of the Chinese offer to the Wall Street Journal last week.

“Given that the relationship with Washington DC has cooled for structural reasons, what’s not to like [from the Saudi perspective]?” he said. “On nuclear, since they have extractable reserves of uranium, though how much is disputed, it makes sense to generate power with nuclear. Every extra barrel of oil exported and not consumed domestically at a fraction of the world price is a net gain.”

Sir John, an analyst on Middle East affairs at the think tank Policy Exchange, added: “My guess is they’d much rather the US built any nuclear plant. It’d be better quality and give the US a further stake in the Kingdom’s stability. So some of this is a troll. But it only works if Washington DC thinks China is a real alternative.”

Saudi officials have indeed suggested that they would prefer a US-led nuclear power programme, with one option being a South Korean contractor backed by US expertise.

While the proposal from state-owned China National Nuclear Corp is 20 per cent cheaper, Saudi Arabia remains hugely dependent on US arms imports such as fighter jets.

Crown Prince Mohammed has also signalled that he wants to forge an even deeper defence partnership with Washington, a goal that could run aground if he is perceived as being too pro-China.

Complicating matters further is an ongoing, intense round of talks led by Washington on a potential Saudi-Israeli normalisation deal which could be signed within a year. US nuclear aid is said to be one of Saudi Arabia’s key conditions for embracing Israel in those talks, along with major concessions from the Israeli government addressing the conflict with the Palestinians.

The inclusion of nuclear power in the much wider diplomatic game of Israeli-Saudi-US relations could make it difficult for China to coax Riyadh closer to their approach on providing a power plant.

If a normalisation deal with Israel were secured it would be the biggest diplomatic breakthrough in the Middle East in a generation. However, sources familiar with the Saudi position on the negotiations say that, whatever may have been agreed on the nuclear file, there has been virtually no progress in talks on the Palestinian issue.

Inside the Kingdom, reports of a Chinese bid to build nuclear power plants is being read as a sign that the Crown Prince simply wants to keep all his options open to maximise his leverage.

“Saudi Arabia doesn’t prefer to move away from Washington, and Saudis appreciate US technology. However, it’s important to consider that international relations are complex and multifaceted,” said Mohammed Alhamed, an analyst of Saudi affairs and president of the consultancy group Saudi Elite.

“While Saudi Arabia may be exploring opportunities with China, it doesn’t necessarily indicate a complete shift in their alignment away from the United States, especially in security partnerships,” he added.

Reputation as youthful moderniser

Aged 37, the Crown Prince has fought hard to establish a reputation inside Saudi Arabia as a youthful moderniser: the ruler who lets women drive and who builds futuristic multi-million megacities such as the Neom project.

But his reputation overseas was severely tarnished by the 2018 murder of Jamal Khashoggi, the Washington Post columnist, as well as a wider crackdown on internal dissent. The Crown Prince vehemently denies that he personally ordered the killing and instead blames rogue Saudi agents.

Five years on, the Crown Prince has largely managed to shake off his pariah status, having welcomed Mr Biden last summer to Riyadh. He is also due to embark on a state visit this autumn to London.

Whichever side the Crown Prince eventually chooses in the tug-of-war on nuclear provisions, it reflects how he has become an immensely desirable partner in the Middle East after years in the wilderness.

“I suspect that the US must be favourites for partnership – but all this emphasises the speed of change in the region,” said Alistair Burt, a former UK Middle East minister and expert on Saudi affairs.

“KSA [Kingdom of Saudi Arabia] is in the driving seat, acting in its own interests. Of course, that means choices have to be made, and that responsibility is more difficult than simply following an old pattern of decision-making – which was that what was best for the US was almost axiomatically best for KSA.”